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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
act which might be foreseen as likely to happen as a result of that risk.
It has never been a requirement that the exact nature of the intervening
act be foreseeable.
PAUL K. PLUNKETr.
Torts--Liability of Parent for Willful Injury to Child
By the overwhelming weight of authority in this country an uneman-
cipated minor may not bring an action for personal tort against his
parent.' The Supreme Court of Oregon has recently engrafted an
exception on this general rule, holding that an unemancipated minor
may maintain an action against his parent for a willful or malicious tort.
2
In the Oregon case, a father, intoxicated and accompanied by his
brother and son as passengers, drove his pickup truck at high speed at
night over a mountainous highway. An accident ensued which resulted
in the death of all the occupants of the truck. The court held that the
father's estate could be sued for the wrongful death of the unemancipated
minor, the majority regarding the case as one presenting "willful mis-
conduct" for which the father should be held liable to his son.
With this decision another inroad has been made into the general
rule disallowing tort actions between unemancipated minors and their
parents. The action has been allowed heretofore in the case of a minor
but emancipated child ;3 where the child was of legal age but continued
to live at home with his parents ;4 where the suit was brought by or
against one in loco parentis;5 and in negligence cases where the defend-
ant is protected by liability insurance.6 An unemancipated minor has
I Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891) ; Small v. Morrison, 185
N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923) ; McKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W.
644 (1903) ; see Note, 71 A. L. R. 1071 (1931). "Proprietary torts" between
parent and minor in matters affecting property and contract seem always to have
been freely recognized. Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N. Y. 317, 41 N. E. 26 (1895);
Myers v. Myers, 47 W. Va. 487, 35 S. E. 868 (1900); PaossER, HANDROOH OF
THE LAW OF TORTS 905 (1941).
, Cowgill v. Broock, 218 P. 2d 445 (Ore. 1950).
' Wood v. Wood, 135 Conn. 280, 63 A. 2d 586 (1948) ; Fowlkes v. Ray-O-Vac
Co., 52 Ga. App. 338, 183 S. E. 210 (1935) ; Oliveria v. Oliveria, 305 Mass. 297,
25 N. E. 2d 766 (1940); Taubert v. Taubert, 103 Minn. 247, 114 N. W. 763
(1908); Cafaro v. Cafaro, 14 N. J. Misc. 331, 184 Atl. 779 (Sup. Ct. 1936);
Crosby v. Crosby, 230 App. Div. 651, 246 N. Y. Supp. 384 (1930); Detwiler v.
Detwiler, 162 Pa. Super. 383, 57 A. 2d 426 (1948).
'Ledgerwood v. Ledgerwood, 141 Cal. App. 538, 300 Pac. 144 (1931) ; Farrar
v. Farrar, 41 Ga. App. 120, 152 S. E. 278 (1930); Ponder v. Ponder, 157 So.
627 (La. App. 1934); Weyan v. Weyan, 165 Miss. 257, 139 So. 608 (1932);
Taylor v. Taylor, 232 S. W. 2d 382 (Mo. 1950).
5 Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901); Dix v.
Martin, 171 Mo. App. 266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913); Clasen v. Pruhs. 69 Neb. 278,
95 N. W. 640 (1903) ; Stiber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N. W. 172 (1925).
'Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N. H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932); Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S. E. 2d
343 (1939); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Marchland, [1924] (Can.) S. C. R. 86, 13




also been allowed to sue his mother under a wrongful death statute for
the death of the minor's father resulting from the mother's negligent
operation of an automobile.7
To this list may now be added actions in which the injury sustained
is the result of a willful or malicious tort. Authority on this point is
meager. A New York court, although denying recovery on a showing
of mere negligence, has indicated that an action would lie upon a show-
ing of willful or malicious conduct.8 In Missouri the action has been
allowed on a showing of mere negligence.0
The policy of seeking to preserve domestic tranquility is the reason
most frequently given for denying the action.' 0 Some courts seem to
fear a breakdown of the family unit and a blow to parental discipline
and control." Others rely on the complete lack of adjudicated cases
at common law as precedent and would require action on the part of
the legislature to change the old rule.'2 Other reasons given for deny-
ing the action are possibility of fraud'3 and depletion of the family
treasury. 4
The general rule, in so far as it tends to preserve the peace and
tranquility of the home, seems to be a wholesome one. Mere legal
prohibitions alone, however, will not hold together the family life.'5 The
rule should not be exalted above ordinary common sense, or applied to
all factual situations in tort actions between a minor child and his
parent. As the Oregon court points out, it can hardly be said that an
uncompensated tort makes for peace in the family and respect for the
parent, especially if it be rape,16 a brutal beating,' 7 or as in the present
case, a termination of the relation itself by death as the result of a
wild drunken ride down a dark mountain road. The other reasons
advanced by the court for nonliability are of doubtful validity, even with
regard to ordinary torts.' But, assuming their validity, they do not
'Hale v. Hale. 312 Ky. 867, 230 S. W. 2d 610 (1950) ; Minkin v. Minkin, 336
Pa. 49, 7 A. 2d 461 (1939) ; Munsert v. Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 229 Wis.
581, 281 N. W. 671 (1938).
'See Meyer v. Ritterbush, 196 Misc. Rep. 551, 553, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 595, 598
(Sup. Ct. 1949). Also, an unemancipated minor has been allowed to sue his
unemancipated minor sister in New York. 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 254
(1939).
*Wells v. Wells, 48 S. W. 2d 109 (Mo. 1932) ; Dix v. Martin, 171 Mo. App.
266, 157 S. W. 133 (1913).
oRoller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); Wick v. Wick, 192
Wis. 260, 212 N. W. 787 (1927) ; see McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domes-
tic Relation, 43 HAMv. L. REv. 1030, 1056 (1930).
" Small v. Morrison. 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923).12 Fidelity Say. Bank v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N. W. 2d 613 (1948).
'a Treschman v. Treschman, 28 Ind. App. 206, 61 N. E. 961 (1901).1, Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).1'Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N. Y. 106, 22 N. E. 2d 249 (1939).
" Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905).1 TMcKelvey v. McKelvey, 111 Tenn. 388, 77 S. W. 644 (1903).1SSee McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv L.
Rrv. 1030, 1072-1077 (1930).
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seem persuasive enough to justify denying a child recovery for an in-
jury willfully and maliciously inflicted upon him by his parent.
The North Carolina Supreme Court adopted the general rule of
nonliability in Small v. Morrison,19 a negligence case, notwithstanding
the vigorous dissent of Chief Justice Clark, which closely parallels the
opinion of the majority of the court in the Oregon case.20 However,
the question as to whether an unemancipated minor may sue his parent
for a willful or malicious tort does not seem to have been yet presented
in this state. The Oregon court, by refusing to apply a hard and fast
rule of nonliability to the facts in this case, has recognized a trend
which the North Carolina court should seriously consider when the
question is presented in this state.
EARL W. VAUGHN.
Trusts-Exercise by Will of a Reserved Power of Revocation
In Cohn v. Central National Bank of Richmond' the revocation
clause in an insurance trust agreement read:
"The right is reserved to the insured [settlor]; to revoke or
annul this agreement in whole or in part, and to modify the
terms in any respect . . . on the written demand of the insured,
the trustee shall deliver to him any or all of the policies held
under the terms of this agreement."
Held, the attempted exercise by will of the reserved power of revo-
cation was ineffectual to revoke the trust.
It is clear that a settlor may validly reserve a power to revoke a
trust and stipulate the manner in which such power is to be exercised.
2
When a particular mode of revocation is specified in the reserved power
of revocation, however, it is essential that it be strictly complied with
in order to make the revocation effective.3 When the revocation pro-
1 185 N. C. 577, 118 S. E. 12 (1923), 2 N. C. L. REv. 113 (1924).
20 Clark argues that neither the common law nor statutes deny the child a
right to sue his parent in tort and that the court should never create a precedent
upon a supposed public policy which will deprive anyone of just rights.
'191 Va. 12, 60 S. E. 2d 30 (1950).
'E.g., Nichols v. Emery, 109 Cal. 323, 41 Pac. 1089 (1895); Cramer v.
Hartford-Conn. Trust Co., 110 Conn. 22, 147 Atl. 139 (1929) ; Kelley v. Parker,
181 Ill. 49, 54 N. E. 615 (1899) ; Jones v. Old Colony Trust Co., 251 Mass. 309,
146 N. E. 716 (1925); Nat. Newark & E. Banking Co. v. Rosahl, 97 N. J. Eq.
74, 128 Atl. 586 (1925) ; Richardson v. Stephenson, 193 Wis. 89, 213 N. W. 673
(1927). The settlor may reserve a power to revoke the trust only during his
lifetime, or he may reserve also a power to revoke by will. 3 Scorr, TRusTs
§330.8 (1939). The settlor has power to revoke the trust if and to the extent
that by the terms of the trust he reserved such power. RESTATEMENT, TRuSTS
§330(l) (1935).
'Hill v. Cornwall & Bro.'s Assignee, 95 Ky. 512, 26 S. W. 540 (1894) (power
to revoke by deed is not exercised when deed is undelivered) ; Brown v. Fidelity
Co., 126 Md. 175, 94 Atl. 523 (1915) (settlor reserved power of revocation upon
[Vol. 29
